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Abstract 
How to decide – factors that influence decision 
 
CSR and supplier code of conducts have become commonplace in the last decades and there 
has been a lot of research into why companies use codes of conduct as well as the practical 
outcomes of them but almost nothing on how companies decide on what suppliers to audit. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to see what factors influence how companies decide on 
what suppliers to audit? 
Through interviews with eight companies and three interviews taken from previously written 
student theses, all within retail, with representation from the food, coffee and clothing/textile 
industry nine different factors were found to influence how companies decide on suppliers to 
audit. It was also discovered that, even though the issue of CSR is becoming institutionalized, 
the industry the companies belong to affect the decision more than the issue of CSR and 
codes of conduct itself.  
 






















CSR  Corporate Social Reponsibility 
SCC  Supplier Code of Conduct 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
BSCI  Business Social Compliance Initiative 
BSR  Business of Social Responsibility 
FWF  Fair Wear Foundation 
GL  Geographical location 
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Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a well-known concept in today’s business world; 
most companies work with it in some form or another. There are many definitions of CSR but 
in general the idea is that companies commit to “minimizing or eliminating any harmful 
effects and maximizing its long-run beneficial impact on society” (Hietbrink et al., 2010: 284). 
One central aspect of the CSR spectrum is workers’ rights at suppliers and one of the most 
common ways of working with this issue is by having supplier codes of conduct (SCC) that 
supplier and partners should adhere to (van Tulder & Kolk, 2001). A SCC is a document 
containing paragraphs that explain what the buyer company expects from the supplier in 
terms of workers’ rights. The codes are usually based on the UN resolution on human rights 
and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) convention on workers’ rights (Bartley, 
2007). Sometimes the buyer company will also add other issues to the codes of conduct, such 
as environmental impact and social issues in the surrounding society (Jenkins 2001). 
Suppliers usually need to sign the code of conduct in order to be eligible for business 
relationships with the buyer that has issued the code.  
 
To ensure compliance with these SCC’s companies conduct audits on a fairly regular basis 
(O’Rourke, 2003). These audits are, both by academics and practitioners, perceived to be 
necessary if SCC are to improve workers’ rights in practice, and research has also shown that 
increased auditing lead to improved working conditions (Esbenshade, 2004). There are 
different ways that a supplier can be audited to ensure compliance with codes of conduct. 
Two of the most common ones are audits done by the buyer company using their own trained 
auditors or by a third-party auditor such as a certification organization like SAI. The audits 
usually take place with fairly regular intervals unless there is suspicion of violation of the 
code of conduct or if during the last audit the supplier showed the need to improve on certain 
aspects, then the next audit is usually within a 6-12 month period (Locke et al. 2007).  
 
In parallel with the increased corporate interest in codes of conduct and auditing, the 
academic interest for codes of conduct has also increased. At the moment, there is extensive 
research into why companies work with SCC (van Tulder & Kolk, 2001), what effect codes of 
conduct has (e.g., Locke et al., 2007), how companies monitor the compliance with their 
codes of conduct (O’Rourke, 2003) etc. Yet there is little to no research regarding how 
companies decide on which of their suppliers to audit. In other words, there is limited 
research into what factors companies use to decide which suppliers to audit and which 
suppliers not to audit. Since most companies have numerous suppliers (especially when 
including sub-suppliers as well) and limited resources to spend on audits, the prioritization of 
which suppliers to audit poses a real challenge for companies and it sets the boundary for 
which suppliers (and workers) that are influenced by companies’ SCC.  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to see how companies in three different industries, food, coffee 
and clothing/textile decide upon what supplier to audit. To address the gap in previous 
research, this thesis focuses on the question of:  
What factors influence how companies decide on what suppliers to audit? 
 
Empirically, the focus will be on Swedish retailers within the consumer goods industry that 
sell to stores in Sweden but have suppliers in developing countries. This is interesting because 
the consumer goods industry have several different suppliers and tiers of suppliers, which can 
make it difficult to decide who to audit.  
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In financial terms, this question is about companies finding an effective way to spend their 
limited resources in terms of supplier audits. In workers’ rights terms, this question is about 
which workers are included and excluded in companies’ work with codes of conduct.  
 
The reason for a comparative study is the likelihood of common factors as well as the 
possibility of divergent factors due to differences in products and geographical placement of 
suppliers. 
Previous research into codes of conduct 
In the last two decades (Bartley, 2007) the issue of CSR has grown in both importance and 
execution with companies becoming more aware of the impact they have on local 
communities, environment and workers rights (Jenkins, 2001). Today, companies are 
expected to act in a socially and environmentally responsible way (Mohr, Webb & Harris, 
2001). Companies are also increasingly using CSR as a way to improve their triple bottom 
line (Hart & Milstein, 2003) meaning the financial, environmental and social profit (Tate, 
Ellram & Kirchoff, 2010). Companies do this in part to safeguard its own brand name against 
potentially damaging publicity if inhumane working conditions are exposed within one of 
their suppliers (Egels-Zandén, 2010). Noted by Hietbrink et al (2010) is that CSR has become 
an important factor in brand protection and that this has lead to an increasing awareness of the 
importance of having socially and environmentally responsible suppliers.  
In relation to suppliers, companies have developed codes of conduct to be followed as well as 
several different monitoring mechanisms that are aimed at making sure that the suppliers 
comply with the supplier codes of conduct (Locke et al., 2007). The auditing systems that 
many buyer companies have in place contain such things as both, announced and un-
announced audits of factories, done by internal auditors as well as independent, certified 
auditors (Locke et al., 2007). There is also the ISO standardization that acts as a regulative 
framework for companies in regards to what should be done regarding both environmental 
and social issues (Schwartz & Tilling, 2009).  
 
Carter & Rogers (2007) have done an extensive literature review regarding supply chain 
management and find ways to integrate sustainability, in their words; social, environmental 
and economical criteria. Other authors have studied supply chain management and 
sustainability in the supply chain (Roberts, 2003; Brown & Maloni, 2006; Cramer, 2007; 
Ciliberti, de Haan, de Groot & Pontrandolfo, 2010). There is widespread research into this 
subject, how companies can manage their supply chains and how to implement sustainability 
into the chain.   
 
There is extensive previous research into codes of conduct, and private regulation of workers’ 
rights more generally. Researchers have, for example, taken an interest in why companies 
adopt codes of conduct (van Tulder & Kolk, 2001), the negotiations leading up to certain and 
not other definitions of workers’ rights in codes of conduct (Bartley, 2007), the emergence of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives for auditing workers’ rights (O’Rourke, 2003), how local actors 
use codes of conduct to improve their situation (Yu, 2008), and the effects of codes of 
conduct in practice (Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Locke et al., 2007). However, the question of 
how companies decide on what suppliers to audit (and not to audit) has received little interest 
in previous research. This is somewhat surprising given the importance of this question for 
both the companies working with codes of conduct and for workers that are either included in 
or excluded from companies’ attempts to improve workers’ rights at suppliers. Based on the 
decision made by the company workers at suppliers will either benefit through improved 
standards or be forced to continue to work under unfair conditions. 
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There have been two previous student theses written within the same subject, Vingstrand and 
Annmark (2011) and Staaf and Nilsson (2012) where they have looked at one and three 
companies respectively all within the Swedish retail industry. In their theses the authors all 
found factors that influence the chosen companies’ decisions in regards to suppliers to audit.  
 
There is a gap in previous research where many authors have looked at supply chain 
management, sustainability and codes of conduct but very few have looked at what factors 
influence companies decisions in regards to suppliers to audit. In order for research into 
sustainability in supply chains and the effect of codes of conduct to be effective, there needs 
to be information regarding how companies’ choose between suppliers to audit.  
 
Theory 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) discuss that organizations are divided into two different segments; 
the informal and the formal structures. The formal structure is what is shown outwards, the 
blueprint for the organization. It is through the formal structure and the myths surrounding it 
that a company gains legitimacy. Meyer and Rowan (1977) come to the conclusion that 
efficiency and legitimacy is the same thing, myths that are generated through organizations 
practices and that are diffused through relational networks have legitimacy based on the 
assumption of their rational efficiency.   
 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory focuses on the way meanings become taken for granted in organizational 
arenas (Fligstein, 1997). It is about the process of defining something as an institution, 
something that is taken for granted as being the way that it is. One argument from institutional 
theorists is that engaging in corporate responsibility initiatives can ensure the legitimacy of an 
organization (Peters, Hofstetter & Hoffman, 2011). However, not complying with industry 
standards can lower the legitimacy of a company with such consequences as penalties, 
lowered consumer goodwill and bad public image (Peters et al., 2011). It can be argued that 
what is going on for companies’ is an institutionalization process of what suppliers they are 
(and are not) responsible for. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs 
Institutional entrepreneurs are actors that through their social skills can motivate other actors 
to cooperate through providing them with common meanings and identities (Fligstein, 1997). 
Institutional entrepreneurs can be actors such as NGO’s, governments, stakeholders etc. How 
they affect the organization and the institutionalization of something depends on the amount 
of influence they have as well as their legitimacy. When institutional entrepreneurs establish 
or change an institution it can lead to the development of a fragmented social situation where 
the institutional entrepreneur has “friends” (allies to the institutional entrepreneur) and 
“enemies” (actors that defend the institutional status quo) (Peters et al., 2011). One example is 




Institutional logic is a derivative of institutional theory and discusses the different kinds of 
logics that can exist within an organization, society or country. Jackall (1988:112) describe 
institutional logics as, “…the way a particular social world works”. Meaning the reason 
behind companies’ actions is based on the logic they follow, the way their world works. In 
this study institutional logics could be assumed to shape, for example the number of tiers and 
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how far down the tiers a company takes responsibility, the number of suppliers and how many 
of these are audited and if suppliers in the same tier are treated differently. In other words, 
institutional logics will affect which factors are used when companies decide what suppliers 
to audit. 
 
All three of these facets of institutional theory are applicable for this study for different 
reasons, i) institutional theory helps us understand the process of institutionalizing (taking for 
granted) issues such as what suppliers to audit, ii) institutional entrepreneurs help us 
understand the actors that can affect this institutionalization process and iii) institutional logic 
help us understand the different ways in which companies decide on which suppliers to audit.  
 
Issue fields 
There are different ideas in institutional theory regarding the domain in which 
institutionalization and institutional logics operate. Traditionally the idea has been that 
organizational fields shape this (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, authors such as 
Hoffman (1999) talks about issue fields instead and the fact that as organizations form around 
an issue that has an significance to these organizations, issues become centers of debate where 
different actors negotiate for right to interpretation. Issue fields develop through interaction 
between different organizations and actors that have common interests and objectives.  
In this study, the issue field is corporate responsibility toward the supplier and the 
organizational field is defined as the industry the companies work in.  
Method 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze what factors that influence how companies decide on 
what suppliers to audit? 
Given the limited previous research into this question, it is reasonable to adopt a qualitative 
approach. The empirical material was mainly collected using interviews with persons 
responsible for code of conduct issues at suppliers at Swedish retailers in the consumer 
industry. Besides doing interviews, secondary data was used in the form of two previous 
student theses’ that had been written on the same subject (Vingstrand & Annmark, 2011; 
Staaf & Nilsson, 2012), focusing on one and two companies respectively. Both theses were 
based on interviews with relevant persons. The author conducted eight interviews while three 
respondents and correlating data was taken from the two previously written student theses. In 
total, eleven (11) retailers were included in this study. The companies in the study were 
chosen based on two criteria: how well known the company is in Sweden and that they sold 
products that were produced outside of Europe and the United States. These two criteria were 
chosen as it was reasoned that they would contribute relevant data.  
 
An interview guide was developed based on the interview guides in the two previously 
written theses. After this three pilot interviews were conducted and the interview guide was 
modified slightly for each interview to fit the company and the respondent. The pilot study 
showed that relevant data could be collected using interviews and five more interviews were 
conducted at five more companies, the remaining three companies were taken from a 
secondary source, i.e. the theses. The respondents were chosen based on their role in the 
organization; most were either responsible for corporate responsibility/sustainability issues or 
worked with these issues (McKernan, 1996). All interviews were conducted in Swedish and 
the author translated the quotes used in the text from Swedish to English. Half of the 
conducted interviews were done face to face while the remaining four were conducted over 
the phone due to the respondents’ geographical placement. All the respondents were asked for 
consent to record the interviews as well as given the choice to be anonymous, most did not 
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care but as two companies requested to be anonymous it was decided that all of the 
companies would be anonymous. Even though most of the material in the study can be found 
using other sources having the companies anonymous ensures that it is not as easy to find out 
which company works with CSR and SCC issues in what way.   
 
The interviews were transcribed and the resulting data coded, by the author, into factors that 
had an influence over the decision-making process of which suppliers to audit (Kvale & 
Brinkman, 2009). These factors were found by coding the respondents answers and see what 
common denominators were found. Once all of the material had been coded it was converted 
into a table to facilitate further analysis (Silverman, 2006). Further analysis of the material 
lead to consolidation of some factors while others were removed. Further coding also 
identified gaps in the empirical data and follow-up questions to the different respondents were 
posed via e-mail as to close these gaps.  
 
Once the replies to the follow-up questions had been received the data was once more looked 
over and the new answers used to clarify data. After this the empirical data was composed and 
divided into the different factors showing the different answers from the respondents with a 
short discussion part. Towards the end of the process the empirical data segment was e-mailed 
to the respondents in order for them to be able to correct or add things they felt necessary. 
This was however done at the author’s discretion.  
Empirical data 
Table 1 depicts the companies that have been studied in the course of this thesis. It gives a 
brief overview of relevant data concerning the company such as ownership, size, products etc. 
Table 1 also show whether or not the companies belong to a 3rd party membership and if they 
conduct audits by themselves or through a third party auditor or, where applicable, both. 
 
As can be seen in the table almost all of the companies have codes of conduct that are based 
on ILO and UN conventions in regards to workers- and human rights, the BSCI codes are also 
based on these conventions. 
 
All of the companies conducts some form of audit/control of their suppliers, most also utilize 
third party auditors, either from an initiative they are part of or hired auditors. This shows that 
there is awareness from the buyer companies that it is important to ensure compliance with 
the code of conduct and to have continuous dialogue with the suppliers. 
 
Table 2 shows the different companies and the factors that affect the decision of which 
supplier to audit. Underneath the table is a short definition of each factor to make it more 
understandable for the reader. In the text all companies will be shortened to Co.X (company 
x). 
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           Table 2  
 
• Grade during previous inspection; depending on if the supplier received a passable grade or need for improvement the audits will be done 
closer in time 
• Geographical location; if the supplier is located in a high-risk country the audits will be done more often, spacing of suppliers 
geographically   
• Risk; industry/product/area/product importance/consumer awareness, all factors that have to do with risk such as product e.g. coffee, 
consumer awareness e.g. bananas etc.  
• Name brand product; the company has its’ own name on the product. This will increase the likelihood of audits 
• New supplier; if a new supplier will be audited before an order is placed 
• Importance of supplier; if the supplier is of great importance to the company, e.g. the only supplier or the largest supplier 
• % of purchase; how large the purchase is,from the buyer company’s perspective, % of the suppliers stock and monetary size of purchase 
• Resources; if the company says that the amount of resources available affects their decision. Using this factor the companies decides on 
the most critical suppliers to audit 
• Membership in 3rd party initiative/3rd party certification; if the company is a member of an initiative that comprises a database of 
suppliers and buyer companies. If the supplier is audited by a third party certification organization.
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Grade during previous audit 
A little less than half of the interviewees said that one big factor in deciding which supplier to 
audit was the grade that the supplier hade gotten during the previous audit, if the grade was 
low then they would return sooner than if the grade was high. The respondent for Co.A. put it 
this way; 
  
“If you are unacceptable then we’ll be back fairly soon, then we’ll be back within 
3-6 months. If you’re good, I think I’ve seen out of all of our audits maybe 1 in 300 that are 
good and the demands are fairly tough to get good, well then we might not be back for three 
years, there is no reason for us to run at a supplier that unique.” 
 
The companies that said that previous grade influenced the decision, had three or four 
different grades that could be given; unacceptable, need for improvement, acceptable and 
good (some variations of name occurred). All of the interviewees said that suppliers always 
have a chance to improve no matter what grade they get. As the respondent for Co.A. said; 
 
 “…unless the supplier keeps showing the same deviations then they are not 
interesting for us as suppliers. But everyone is given a second chance. Unless we are denied 
access, in that case you’re not given a second chance.” 
 
This is echoed by Co.B. that say that if there are issues that need to be improved a revisit will 
usually occur between 2-6 months after the initial audit. Co.G say that their audit report takes 
into consideration how well the factory owner controls the number of working hours, 
environment, if the workers have the appropriate safety equipment etc. The respondent at 
Co.G. goes on to say; 
  
“Factories that have shown weakness on these issues are therefore controlled 
through “re-audits”, and we have our eyes on them.”  
 
Almost all of the companies that use this factor have the same basic time frame for re-visits, 
between 3-6 months, sometimes longer depending on the type of product or the kind of 
improvements needed, e.g. renovations. The exception to this is Co.J. that says that they do a 
re-visit but did not give a specific time frame; they decided together with the supplier how 
long the supplier would need in order to rectify the findings. Co.K. say that they usually do a 
re-audit within three months if there has been need for improvement; sometimes this time 
frame can be longer if there are major renovations needed. The fact that re-visits are done 
fairly soon is a way for the companies to create legitimacy and show that they take the audits 
seriously and care about ensuring improvements at their suppliers.  
 
That the rest of the companies did not put this factor as something they take into 
consideration does not mean that it is not part of the process, it could be that it is considered 
to be “outside” of the decision process. If a supplier gets a low grade then the buyer company 
will automatically have to do a re-audit to ensure improvement, it could be that some of the 
companies look at this as being separate from supplier that have yet to be audited or who got 
a better grade.  
 
Geographical location 
The companies’ that focus on foods or on clothes all said that geographical location was an 
important factor. Co.B. says; 
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“We have gotten the countries classified according to this (risk factors) and a 
typical high-risk country is China. […] It was done in two ways, one Sustainia has done based 
on a number of factors such as human rights, environmental legislation and control, corruption 
and a few more. A university that has looked at results from real audits has done the second 
one. ” 
 
They go on to say that the countries that they consider to be the highest risk countries have 
more audits than low risk countries. The respondents who talk about high and low risk 
countries give China as an example of a high-risk country while Italy is a low risk country.  
When deciding which countries are to be considered high-risk Co.A. follows the UNDP 
which is the UN’s Human development index where a score of <0.85 in human development 
index and a score of <0.50 on the economical security index classifies that country as a high-
risk country.  
Co.I. say; 
  
“We have a philosophy of not working with countries that are not 
democratic…China is not. Therefore we have chosen not to work with China.” 
 
None of the other companies in the study have expressed this sentiment in regards to country 
or even product, all of them are aware of the difficulties with certain products or countries but 
have not gone to the same length as Co.I. Most of the other companies can be considered to 
be dependent on being able to have suppliers in high-risk countries or sell products that are 
risky in order to be competitive on their respective markets.  
 
Co.K. and Co.H. also look at geographical location regarding where in relation to each other 
the suppliers are located, not simply from a risk perspective. Co.G. looks at the geographical 
location and focuses their audits on suppliers in countries that can be considered high-risk 
(like both Co.B. and Co.A.); therefore the geographical location comes into play.  
Most of the companies that utilize this factor do so in conjunction with the factor of risk, they 
look at high-risk countries and focus their audits there.  
 
The companies where coffee is the main retail area do not focus on geographical location as a 
factor when deciding which suppliers to audit. This is not very surprising since coffee is only 
grown in certain geographical locations and the coffee companies therefore have no choice 
but to buy their product from these locations.  
Co.C. says; 
 
 “Ethiopia is very politically sensitive, there can be no foreign exporters in the 
country so you, we cant buy from local, because of the risk we don’t buy directly from Ethiopia, 
we buy from traders, who unfortunately cannot have their own contacts that sign the contract, 
at least in Ethiopia. So it’s a bit tricky. But it’s an important country so we can’t stop buying 
from there either. […] We have a very direct dialogue with our suppliers.” 
 
Co.D. explains this; 
 “…our own controls are our trips where we with certain frequency visit the ones 
(suppliers) we work with and we do this for third-party certified as well, fair-trade and so 
on…we believe in long-term relations, we have had supplier-relations since the 1940’s-1950’s 
in certain instances and of course, we get to know them because we believe that is the best way 
to control them”.   
 
Only one company say that the location of the suppliers within a country, no matter if it is a 
high or low risk country can affect the frequency with which audits are done. Co.J. try to find 
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suppliers that are close to their existing suppliers in order to be able to be efficient on the 
visits.  
“…then you try to be as efficient as possible when you do these trips so vi try to make 




In this category all factors to do with risk have been consolidated into one in order to give a 
better overview.  
 
Co.A. and Co.B. are two grocery-companies that have a lot of different products, both food 
and non-food. Co.A. says that; 
 
 “…if you look at Swedish berry-picking for example then after a couple of summers 
we can see that there is a risk here. It doesn’t matter that Sweden is a non-risk country. We 
have entered an area of risk” 
 
In regards to consumer awareness Co.B. responded: 
 
“…if it is a type of product we get a lot of questions on then that can also 
influence, for example cut flowers from Kenya”  
 
Co.A. gave a similar response: 
 
“We know that coffee is a very critical product with large numbers of 
environmental and social problems connected to it. So there we choose to go a step further back 
down to the farmer.” 
 
Two of the coffee companies say that they use this factor, Co.D. say; 
 
 “It depends. Partly it’s over time if you see a risk, a risk assessment…” 
 
A lot of the textile industry has production units in high-risk countries where chemicals are 
used in the dying process. This leads to an integrated problem within the industry of both 
high-risk environments and products.  
Co.I. put it this way; 
 
 “We don’t have that many (suppliers) so the ambition is that we should be able to 
cover all but if you have to prioritize which to audit first then you might choose the ones that 
are the sewing lines first, the high-risk countries first…” 
 
At Co.J. they say;  
 ”…we do some type of risk assessment but the goal is that we will visit all 
suppliers. But it can be that we might not visit a supplier that we know we will only have for a 
season because we know that it is a product that we won’t have again…” 
 
At Co.J. that sell both clothing, home furnishing and cosmetics they are in the process of 
making a risk assessment in order to find products that need to be more closely monitored 
from an environmental perspective. The respondent says; 
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 “…in our own action plan we have put in that on certain products we will go deeper 
to follow the environmental issue in a more detailed way. […]The dye-works where we believe 
there is a lot of chemicals’ or where you use a lot of water.” 
 
Co.G. has chosen to have a focus on suppliers in high-risk countries. They say; 
 
 “It has to do with geographical impact to an extent, but we also look at grading of 
the supplier and the size.” 
 
Most of the companies say that they do some form of risk assessment in order to prioritize 
between the different suppliers, and this assessment can be based on product type, product 
importance (i.e. if it is the main product of the company), consumer awareness or industry. 
That risk assessments are used in order to prioritize between the suppliers appears to be a 
quite strategic move, where can the most damage be done to the company due to a non-
compliant supplier?  
 
Name brand product 
Co.A., Co.B., Co.G. and Co.J. say that their name brand on a product is a factor in their 
supplier selection process. Co.G. audits the suppliers that make textiles for their name brand, 
their main suppliers, before auditing other, smaller suppliers.  
Co.A. explains their decision to have an extra focus on name brand product suppliers with; 
 “We have a bigger responsibility, both legally and morally, for our own brands than 
for say Arla or Coca Cola… .” 
 
They also mention that they do no audit brands that are not their own unless Co.A. is the 
exclusive retailer for that particular brand.  
 
Co.B. says; 
 “…if it is our own brand name products then there is a bigger focus and if they are 
big products then we also prioritize that over a more marginal product.” 
 
Co.I only sell their own brand name but say that this is a factor that they look at.  
 
Five out of the eleven companies looked at use this factor; most of them were companies that 
sell both their own brand name products as well as other companies products. There are other 
companies that have their name on the product but they do not sell products from other 
companies, meaning that all of their products are brand name products, which for these 
companies, makes this factor obsolete. If a company only has products with their own brand 
name then other factors will be more important to take into consideration when deciding on 
suppliers to audit.  
 
New supplier 
Co.A., Co.B, Co. D., Co.F, Co.J. and to a certain extent Co.G., Co.H. and Co.I. say that a new 
supplier will be informed about the code of conduct and semi-audited before an order is 
placed. Co.I. are in the process of implementing new routines where new suppliers will be 
audited. Co.B. say that; 
 
 “…the ones that are purchasers at our office in Shanghai, before the contract is 
signed they have a fairly ambitious list of different kinds of questions that they go through with 
the suppliers, but it’s not an audit but it’s a kind of control.” 
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Co.A. says that; 
 “…we always start with ensuring that the supplier commits through a contract that 
they will follow the demands we have that there will be no harmful child labour and so on. Then 
in what we call risk countries or high-risk countries we do a follow up audit.” 
 
Co.F. say; 
 “…new suppliers of course, always new suppliers.” 
 
Co.D. say; 
 “…we have tough criteria to become a new supplier and this is regulated in our 
purchasing policy[…]the intention of meeting them before an order is placed is crystal clear.”  
 
One company that expressively says that they do not take this into consideration is Co.K. 
They do not conduct audits at new suppliers before an order has been placed, they do not 
consider it motivated to expect that a supplier should make changes when there is no 
guarantee that they buyer company will continue to put in orders.  
Co.K. puts it this way; 
 
 “If we are only placing one order of Christmas baubles from a supplier then it is not 
reasonable to implement the code of conduct just for the sake of implementing it.” 
 
Co.J. say that they might not conduct a formal audit at a new supplier but that they will go to 
the factory and do a control to ensure that there are no major issues. They have made a deal 
with Fair Wear Foundation (F.W.F) that a member from the F.W.F team goes along to day 
visits at suppliers just to ensure that everything looks ok, even though it is not a formal audit. 
Co.J. say;  
 
 “… I visited some new suppliers with this auditor just to see that they have all the 
documents, do they have any routines, some of them have been audited before so they know the 
process.” 
 
At Co.H. they do not place an order if the supplier cannot fulfill some base requirements, 
which is expressed this way; 
 
 “ It is very hard to rank which demands that are more important than the 
others…Then you know that this base, everyone has to manage the base. In here is for example 
fire and safety as well as child labour.” 
 
Some of the companies have stated that they do not believe it fair to put so much pressure on 
a new supplier before an order has been placed since there is no guarantee that they buyer 
company will continue to place large orders. To force a supplier to implement changes just to 
be eligible to receive orders is not something that will promote trust and a desire to work 
together, some of the interviewed companies believe. It would seem natural to audit a new 
supplier so that, if issues are discovered, the buyer company can either find a different 
supplier or try to work together with the supplier in order to solve these issues. It is a way for 
both the buyer company and the supplier to ensure a more long-term relationship by showing 
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Importance of supplier 
If a buyer company only has one or two suppliers of a certain product then these will be 
higher on the list of suppliers to be audited than if the buyer company has six or seven 
suppliers of one product. Co.A. say;  
 
 “If we have many suppliers so that we can switch between, then one supplier isn’t 
extremely important for us if we have four others we can use if one should fall. Unlike if we only 
have one.”  
 
A second part of this factor is if the supplier is the biggest for a certain type of product, there 
could be several smaller suppliers that produce the same product but at a much smaller scale. 
This will make the biggest supplier more important for the company to audit. Co.I. says that; 
 
 “…then it depends on the quantity that we have put there, if it is the majority of all 
products then of course we need to audit that supplier even if it is not a high-risk supplier, but if 
it is someone that we only have one article that is a very low quantity then they might not end up 




 “The five-ten factories that we work with most are important to have a continuous 
presence at in some way. At the same time many suppliers have worked for us, sometimes, between 
twenty and forty years which gives a different kind of security.” 
 
None of the other companies specifically said that this is a factor that they look at. There was 
a higher mention of product importance and percentage of purchase from different suppliers 
than straight focus on important suppliers.  
 
Percentage of purchase 
This factor entails the % of the buyer company’s product they get from a supplier, the % of a 
suppliers stock/production that a buyer company acquire as well as monetary amount of 
purchase. More than half of the companies interviewed used this factor in determining which 
of their suppliers should be audited. Most said that a supplier that they got a majority of their 
production from was more prioritized than a supplier that was responsible for a smaller part.  
Co.G. says; 
 
 “Finally it is more natural to put more focus on auditing the bigger suppliers that 




 “It depends. Partly it is over time if you see a risk, a risk-assessment then it is also 
to do with volume and depending on what type, if there is a third-party certification we might do 
fewer visits there so it’s those three parameters.”   
 
Co.I. formulates it like this; 
 “…then it depends a bit on the quantity that we have there, if it is the majority of all 
products then of course we have to audit that supplier…” 
 
The respondent for Co.F says; 
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 “You start, everyone that has a turnover above 15 000 USD at their factory, we take 
them first and then we can think about if we feel that there are some other suppliers, then we 




 “…then big products (high turnover) we also prioritize higher than if it is a more 
marginal product.” 
 
And at Co.K. the same thought is echoed; 
 
 “Of course size of the supplier matters, or rather, how much of our production is 
located at the individual manufacturer.” 
 
Co.H. also base some of their decisions on the size of purchase from the supplier; 
 
 “I the beginning, if you have 2000-3000 suppliers then there is no possibility to 
audit all at once. Most companies usually start with the most important and biggest suppliers 
and then you keep going.” 
 
This factor can be tied in with the importance of a supplier to a certain extent as a supplier 
that produces a high percentage of a company’s products will be more important than a 
supplier that produce a small amount of products. However more companies say that they 
take this factor into consideration than the importance of the supplier. The differentiation 
between these two factors is interesting to note since it could be argued that they measure the 
same basic thing that it is simply semantics to look at them as two different factors.  
 
Resources 
Some of the companies interviewed cite a lack of resources as a major factor in deciding 
which of their suppliers to audit. Some of the companies say that resources play a part in the 
decision but is not a major factor in the decision.  
As Co.C. say; 
 
 “We, none of us, neither we nor W or X or Y or Z or, we have none of us, it’s only 
one or two persons at the purchasing department no matter where you go. So there is no team 
of people you can send out to audit.” 
 
Co.E. echoes this sentiment; 
 
 “… if  you put that in relation to that we have direct contact with 500 000 
growers/year we, with all the will in the world we couldn’t reach 10 million because we are not 
enough people to be able to carry through.” 
 
Co.B. say; 
 “We audit as far down as to where we experience that the main production takes 
place…because otherwise it never ends, it’s a question of resources.” 
 
At Co.G. there is only one person at the headquarters who works with audit and control of 
suppliers, which limits the number of suppliers that can be audited each year. 
 
However, a break from what most companies have said Co.J. do not cite resources as a factor 
that has any great impact on which of their suppliers to audit. Co.J. say; 
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 “So far I have never gotten a no to an audit due to finances.” 
 
The rest of the companies interviewed alluded to the limited amount of resources but most 




 “We are quite present anyways at the factory even if we don’t do audits, there’s a lot 
of people who go down and check the production, sample handling and in Italy we have an 
agent who works there with five employees who control our products each day so we have quite 
a high presence anyway.” 
 
That the other companies do not cite resources as a factor in their decision on which supplier 
to audit does not necessarily mean that it is not taken into consideration. All of the companies 
have limited resources to spend on travel and personnel, something that is required in order to 
conduct audits at suppliers that are usually located on a different continent. It could be that the 
variables that the companies take into consideration are being analyzed within the frame of 
resources given to the purchasing/CSR/supply chain departments.  
 
Membership in a 3rd party initiative/audited by a 3rd party certification 
There is a spread of membership in different organizations that aim at creating a database that 
buyer companies can look at to see if their suppliers have passed an audit related to the UN 
and ILO conventions. Co.G., through their mother company, as well as Co.F is part of BSCI, 
Co.E. is part of AIM, Co.H. is part of BSR and Co.I. are part of Fair Wear Foundation as well 
as Textile Exchange. Co.J. is also part of Fair Wear Foundation. Besides these the other 
companies all say that 3rd party certification is a factor in favor of auditing a supplier less 
frequently, perhaps not at all. The quotes show how some of the companies reason regarding 
membership on a third party initiative and third party certifications.  
 
Co.C.: 
 “We have a dialogue and that we always try to increase the amount of certified 
coffee, because it is through certified coffee that we can make demands, and it is also there we 
can make sure that the demands are being followed.” 
 
Co.F.: 
 “…through BSCI suppliers are invited to different trainings in order to be able to 
improve and we do this together to a fairly high extent.” 
 
Co.E.; 
 “But then we also have a different monitoring program called AIM-progress…It’s a 
control system that means that through a database you type in for example when we are buying 
coffee from Kenya, you go in and type that we are buying coffee from this exporter and it’s 
going this route. This way the hope is to build a database that is transparent and that also 
means that if somebody doesn’t behave then they will be removed from this system and then it 
will be reveald, not just to the buyer that the product is going to but to everyone.” 
 
At Co.I. the question about 3rd party certification is answered with; 
 
 “No, no, you have to, even if it’s, for in a way it’s like fair-trade certification is 
really just for the cotton so that’s no guarantee that it will be ok for the entire supply chain, we 
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can’t just trust that…But then it’s a good thing that they do have a certification but then it’s no 
guarantee that it’s a good thing/ for non-compliances in the production chain (the product).” 
 
Co.D.; 
 “Our own controls are our travels where we with some frequency visit the ones we 
work with and we do this for third party certified as well, fair-trade and so on…if there is a 
third party certification we might do fewer visits.” 
 
Co.J.; 
 “I followed up an audit in Turkey and then it was a different Fair Wear Foundation 
member, there are quite a few Swedish companies that are part of FWF and then I had 
received, we share the audit reports with each other. So the control I did was based on the 
information that were in the report and what I noticed was that it was a pretty good factory. But 
what they hadn’t noticed was that this factory used ten sub-suppliers and then, usually it can be 
that you have a nice factory that you show and you get good audit grading on it but it’s not sure 
that the clothes are manufactured there. So what’s important is to have a good knowledge of 
where the clothes are produced and you can get that if you have close contact, frequent visits to 
the factory.” 
 
Most of the companies that are part of some kind of initiative are within the textile or apparel 
industry where there are several different, well-organized initiatives those companies can be 
part of. Co. K is the only company that is not part of an initiative nor do they specifically say 
that certification from a third party will affect which of their suppliers they will audit.  
 
Analysis 
The data gathered during this study clearly shows that there are differences between the three 
different industries, coffee, food and clothing/textile, within which the companies are located.  
Looking at the empirical data gathered during the study four different logics can be seen 
(Jackall, 1988), that the companies use when they are deciding on which suppliers to audit. 
These four are CSR, efficiency, risk and organizing logic and are explained below. Together 
with the explanation of the different logics is also the different factors that can be connected 
to them, most of the factors can be connected to more than one logic. All of this is 
summarized in table 3 at the end of this segment.   
 
The logics 
Jackall (1988) discuss different logics that affect the way that a company looks at the rest of 
the world and that influence the actions and decisions taken by these companies. Looking at 
the data collected during this thesis there are four different logics that can be seen when 
analyzing the data; CSR or worker’s rights logic, efficiency logic, risk logic and knowledge 
logic. There is no one company that use just one of these four logics, all of them are used in a 
mix depending on which factor and company is looked at. All of these logics connect to the 
underlying reason for a company’s actions, why they do what they do.  
 
CSR logic 
This logic connects to companies wanting to ensure worker’s rights and fair conditions at 
suppliers. Using this logic companies prioritize settings where they believe there are problems 
such as high-risk countries or buying certified products, as this will ensure better conditions 
for workers. Within this logic companies conduct risk assessments to find out where there is a 
risk of breach of the SCC in regards to workers rights. Within this logic is also membership in 
third party initiatives as these works towards ensuring fair conditions for workers as well as 
sustainable supply chains. 
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Within this logic one part of geographical location can be found, shortened to GL A, which 
connects to CSR as companies look at countries and regions where there is a risk of braches 
of the SCC such as China. In connection to both GL A and the CSR logic is the risk factor. 
The companies in the study talked about different kinds of risks based on different criteria. 




There are two parts to this efficiency logic. The first one is connected to ensuring “bang for 
the buck” meaning that companies want as much result as possible from an action. The 
second part of efficiency logic is doing audits for other reasons such as quality and looking at 
issues regarding workers rights at the same time. This is a way for the company to be efficient 
and get information regarding working conditions and workers rights while having a different 
main reason for being at the supplier.  
 
Within the “bang for the buck” logic is geographical location, shortened to GL B, where 
companies try to find suppliers that are located close to each other in a country or region as to 
be able to visit more of them in a fixed amount of time. Connected to this logic is also 
prioritizing suppliers in the first tier as they are well known to the company and therefore 
easy to audit. Trusting third party certification and initiatives can also be part of this logic as 
it ensures results without the company having to spend large amount of resources on auditing 
suppliers. Risk connected to the second part of this logic is regarding risks to the company 
that can be good to know, something that is tagged onto an audit being done for a different 
reason in order to be prepared. This risk factor is called risk B and connects more to risks to 
the efficiency such as loosing a supplier or income due to disrupted production.  
 
Risk logic 
There are different parts to this logic. One connects to if the company has been exposed to 
something, e.g. bad publicity due to unfair conditions. The second part is pre-emptive logic 
that is based upon the belief that if something becomes public it will harm the company, “how 
would people react to X?” Asking this question and then doing audits and controls in order to 
ensure that these risks are minimized. The third part of this logic is connected to more of a 
business risk such as loosing income due to only having one supplier for a product and that 
supplier being shut down for some reason. A second example of this is if a supplier that 
produces a name brand product is discovered not to comply with the SCC, which could lead 
to lesser profit for the company due to lowered customer support.  
 
Connected to this risk logic is also the risk factor found during the study. The risk factor 
connects to the risk logic when the companies act on the foundation of the risk logic such as 
doing risk assessments in order to be aware of potential risks to the company, no matter what 
it is. This part of the risk factor is called risk C.  
 
Organizing logic 
This logic is more connected to third party initiatives even though it can be connected to 
buyer companies as well. Through a report due to be released in 2012 this logic has been 
found to influence third party initiatives in regards to audit of suppliers. There are two parts to 
this logic, legitimacy and structure. The legitimacy part is about creating legitimacy for the 
teams conducting the audits through being active in all regions, no matter where the supplier 
is located. Third party initiatives have to be active wherever suppliers are located, even if it is 
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very remote in order to create legitimacy for their certification. The second part of this logic is 
structure where third party initiatives that have teams in different locations have to conduct 
audits with certain regularity in order to ensure occupation for the auditors. Connected to this 
part is also the need to keep the structure of audits viable and the auditors up to date on new 
policy or ways of working.  
 
Grade during previous audit is one factor connected to this logic as it is part of the structure 
used by the organization. Two other factors are also connected to this logic, resources and 3rd 
party initiatives as resources are dependent on the structure of an organization and 3rd party 
initiative can be part of creating legitimacy for an organization.  
 
Table 3. 
Factor/Logic CSR Efficiency Risk Organizational 
Grade during 
previous audit   X   X 
GL A X       
          
Geographical 
location         
          
GL B   X     
          
Risk A X       
          
Risk B   X     
          
Risk C     X   
          
          
Name brand     X   
          
New supplier X X     
          
Importance of 
supplier     X   
          
% of purchase   X X   
          
Resources X X   X 
          
3rd party 
initative X X   X 
 
The table above shows how the different factors found in the study connects with the four 
different logics discovered (Jackall, 1988). As can be clearly seen most of the factors belong 
to more than one logic, this shows that there is no one way to use a factor but that it depends 
on which logic is being used to interpret them.  
 
Issue fields 
Hoffman (1999) talks about issue fields and looking at the data two different kinds of fields 
become clear, an issue field regarding CSR and a branch field regarding the different 
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branches the companies belong to. It could be expected that within an issue field the different 
actors would act in the same way no matter what industry they belong to. However, based on 
this study, it does not appear as if the issue field is the main factor that affects the companies, 
it is the branch field. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discuss, when actors work to change 
their organizations to fit a field they inadvertently make the organizations more and more 
similar to each other. This can be connected to the concept of institutional entrepreneurs that 
Fligstein (1997) discuss, within each branch field the different actors can be considered 
institutional entrepreneurs as they affect each other and are part of changing their joint social 
world. The way that one company decides to work with CSR issues will affect the way that 
their competitors work with the same kind of issues, they affect each other both within their 
branch field and the issue field of CSR (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This effect is apparent 
throughout the data as most of the companies within each industry use many of the same 
factors as their branch competitors leading to the conclusion that they influence each other.   
 
There are both differences and similarities between the different industries in the study, 
almost all companies, at least a majority from each industry, use the risk, percentage of 
purchase and 3rd party membership/certification factors. This shows that within the issue filed 
(Hoffman, 1999) of CSR there are common ways to look at monitoring and auditing, no 
matter which industry the companies belong to (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At the same time 
there are more similarities within each branch field, which shows that branch or industry is a 
larger deciding factor than issue.  
 
Clothing/textile industry 
By looking at both table 2 and table 3 it becomes clear that the factors that are most used by 
the clothing/textile industry are connected to all of the four logics but with a higher focus on 
the CSR and efficiency logics. That can be interpreted as the clothing/textile industry, in this 
study, tries to keep their costs down while at the same time being aware of issues that exist at 
suppliers and are trying to ensure better working conditions.  
 
The textile/clothing industry has been subjected to public outcry due to child labor and unfair 
working conditions at suppliers and this has had the consequence of ensuring 
institutionalization of regulations and monitoring organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). A 
second effect of these public cases is that the consumers now expect these companies to 
behave in socially and environmentally responsible ways (Mohr et al., 2001). This 
institutionalization of the ways to work (Fligstein, 1997) with issues of CSR and supply chain 
responsibility should mean that there is one way to work, however, there is a spread between 
the companies in regards to which factors they use and in what way. The reason for this could 
be the fact that the companies are well aware of the common rules and regulations, formal and 
informal, which exist within the industry and are therefore comfortable in using individual 
interpretations of the factors and how they should be used.  
 
The one factor that all of the textile companies in this study use is percentage of purchase, a 
factor that is connected to both efficiency and risk logic. Efficiency as it is an easy factor to 
measure and use and risk as it can affect the income for the company in case a supplier with a 
high percentage of production cannot produce the required amount of products. This factor 
can be seen as institutionalized within this industry as all of the companies, in this study, use 
it (Fligstein, 1997), even though they claim to use it in different ways as Co.F. has a monetary 
amount as their limit.  
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Most of the clothing/textile companies in this study also use geographical location as a factor, 
something that is also connected to both CSR and efficiency logic. The use of this factor 
varies between the different companies’, some use risk A which is connected to CSR logic 
and use this factor as part of a risk assessment to see where there is a high risk for breaches of 
the SCC, where auditing is most needed (Locke et al., 2007). Others use risk B which is more 
connected to efficiency as the companies try to find suppliers as close to each other as 
possible, both within a country and within a region, in order to get more done for the same 
amount of money. One example of this is Co.J. that say that they try to find suppliers as close 
to each other as possible in order to be able to cover more of them during audits (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Co.I. has made the decision not to work within countries that are not 
democracies, such as China. This standpoint is unique in this study; none of the other 
companies have used the geographical location factor in this way. Some of the companies 
also use risk C which is more connected to a general risk assessment of things that could harm 
the company, both profit wise as well as from a CSR perspective.  
 
Co.K. say that they do not audit new suppliers until it becomes clear that they will use that 
supplier more than once. They do not believe it to be legitimate to demand, what can be, large 
changes from a supplier that will only be used for one product, one time. In contrast to this 
both Co.D. and Co.H. refuse to do business with new suppliers before they have been audited 
and approved based on strict criteria which connects to what Hart and Milstein (2003) call the 
triple bottom line where companies are trying to improve their social, environmental and 
financial profit. Co.K’s choice not to audit new suppliers can lead to continued bad working 
conditions for the employees at the factory as well as continuous breaks in human and 
workers rights (Jenkins, 2001).  
 
There is only one company in this industry that claim to look at suppliers producing their 
brand name goods above others and that is Co.G. This factor is connected to risk logic as 
there is a potential risk to the company, both of a lack of profit as well as bad publicity if bad 
conditions are found. Based on the study it stands to reason that Co.G. uses this factor as a 
preventive measure to protect the brand image (Peters et al., 2011). 
 
The coffee industry 
The one industry that uses the least amount of factors is the coffee industry; this could be 
connected to the inherent problems of the industry in regards to monitoring working 
conditions due to a large number of tiers and suppliers in each tier. The amount of tiers makes 
it difficult for the coffee companies to monitor and audit the supply chain all the way down to 
the farmer. Having several tiers of suppliers naturally increase the risk to the company (Peters 
et al., 2011) as well as makes it harder to reach all of them if they are located in different 
geographical locations. This is where third party initiatives have a natural place, they can go 
directly to farmers and not be limited by which they buy coffee from (O’Rourke, 2003). This 
could create further legitimacy for the third party initiatives as well as increase the efficiency 
of them (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
Even though this industry uses few factors the ones that are used are connected to CSR, 
efficiency as well as risk (and to a certain extent organizational) logic (Jackall, 1988). That 
the few factors represent all four of the different logics is interesting as it shows that, at least 
the companies in this study, are trying to both improve workers’ conditions as well as be as 
efficient as possible while at the same time minimizing risk to the company. The reason for 
all four logics being represented within this industry is not very clear, it could be connected to 
the many third party initiatives that operate within this industry or the fact that it is an 
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industry where, as the respondent for Co.C. put it, everyone knows everyone. This 
community and knowledge of competitors makes this an industry where it would appear 
easier to come to joint plans of actions while still being competitive.  
 
The two factors that two of the companies use, Co.C. and Co.D., are risk and third party 
initiative (which is also used by the last company Co.E). In regards to the risk factor they use 
risk C mostly as they do risk assessments to see where there is a risk to the company however, 
both of them also say that they use risk A as it will give an indication of where there are 
problems. It is hard to pinpoint exactly which of the three dimensions within the risk factor 
that is being used as there is usually no clear reason for why it is used, there is usually a mix 
of reasons that belong to all three dimensions. All three coffee companies are either part of an 
initiative or say that they trust third party certification in relation to workers rights. This is a 
way for the companies to ensure that there is some kind of control of working conditions even 
though they might not be able to conduct their own audits, something that connects to both 
the CSR logic as well as efficiency and organizational logic.  
 
Co.C. talk about the fact that the industry is quite small when looking at the buyer companies 
and exporters, taking this closeness into consideration it is surprising that there is such a clear 
difference in how the studied companies act and what they believe is the best way to ensure 
compliance with industry standards and codes of conduct. One would expect to find more 
similarities between the studied companies due to the fact that “everybody knows 
everybody”, which could be expected to lead to similar ways of working since the companies 
influence each other, similar to what Fligstein (1997) discuss regarding institutional 
entrepreneurs. This influence on each other should be apparent here, however the reason for 
this not being the case could be the many third party initiatives that exist. If everyone is part 
of, or trusts, third party initiatives and certifications than the way that the individual company 
acts is more due to their own view of the world and what is best for the company than what 
the competitors are doing.   
 
The food industry 
The two companies in this study that belong to the food industry are Co.A. and Co.B. Of the 
factors found in this study these two companies both use six of the same, Co.A. uses seven in 
total and Co.B. eight. The factors belong to all four of the logics found (Jackall, 1988) which 
shows both the spread of the factors used as well as the fact that there is no clear logic more 
dominant than the others. Mohr et al. (2001) discuss the expectation on companies to behave 
in socially and environmentally responsible ways and this can clearly be seen on these two 
companies where they use many different factors to decide on suppliers to audit. Hietbrink et 
al. (2010) say that SCC’s and audits can be used as a way to protect a company brand and in 
the case of both Co.A. and Co.B. it is clear that they do consider CSR work to be a way to 
protect their names.  
 
Based on the data in this study it there would appear to be an institutionalized way within the 
food industry of how to work with issues of CSR and workers rights. This could be connected 
to the many national and international rules and regulations regarding food that exists but it 
could also be that the companies have influenced each other to act in certain ways (Fligstein, 
1997). Both of the companies looked at in this study use a large number of factors, many of 
them the same ones, which would indicate that there is a taken-for-granted way to work 
within this industry, with no one logic being more used than the others.  
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Both companies say that they do a risk assessment when deciding on suppliers to audit and 
that they also audit suppliers that are not located in a high-risk country if there is indications 
of unfair working conditions. Based on the replies gotten from the two respondents there 
seems to be a high level of CSR awareness within this industry as well as a will to work 
towards ensuring better conditions for workers at suppliers. This shows that the CSR logic is 
quite prevalent here, however as many of the factors used also connect to efficiency, risk and 
organizational logic it is hard to say that one is more used than the others. It would appear that 
it depends on what factor is looked at and the context within which it is being used.  
 
The dimensions in table 4 are all based on information gathered during this study through 
comments from interviewees as well as extrapolated by the author. The number of tiers that a 
company has will affect which factors they use and in what way depending on how far down 
the tiers they audit. The number of suppliers will also affect the decisions as a high number of 
suppliers will naturally require a higher amount of resources than a low amount of suppliers. 
The industry that the company belongs to would appear to be the largest influence on which 
factors are used and in what way. The three different industries looked at in this study have 
some similarities as well as differences between each other, while having greater similarities 
to the competitors within the own industry, which leads to the conclusion that industry is a 
major influence on decisions in regards to supplier audits.  
 
Table 4 
Dimensions/ Efficiency Risk 
Logic 
CSR 
“bang”              “know” pre.              business        prev. 
Org. 
Risk A Geographical 
location B 




Risk B Risk C 





























Brand name % of purchase % of purchase Brand name Grade during 
previous audit 
Industry 




      
 
That there is a spread both within and outside of the different industries of factors that affect 
companies’ decisions is not strange. Even though there are regulations and institutionalized 
norms within all of the industries in the study there is always room for interpretation by the 
companies themselves. All of the companies in the study work within the issue filed of CSR 
(Hoffman, 1999) but due to the fact that there are quite a few differences between the 
industries it is a logical conclusion to draw that industry has more of an effect on the way that 
companies work with CSR than the specific issue field.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose in writing this thesis was to start filing the perceived gap in the sustainable 
supply chain research that deals with how companies choose and prioritize their suppliers. 
This thesis has shown that there are some factors that appear to be common across industry 
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lines while others seem to be more specific depending on the industry looked at. The thesis 
has also shown that there are four main logics at play which affects the way that the different 
factors found are being used. Three different dimensions also influence all of this where the 
industry is the largest influence of the three.   
 
The number of factors being used as well as the many different ways that the companies in 
the study use them shows that there is no clear way to work with the issue of CSR. It would 
appear that companies choose factors as one might pick candy, the ones that seem the best at 
the time. Depending on which factors are picked and the context within which it is applied 
there will be different results and consequences both for the company and for its suppliers.  
There are few clear structures surrounding how the different companies work with CSR and 
as there are many different ways of interpreting the field of CSR this is not surprising. What 
does appear clear however, is that what influences a company’s way of working with these 
kinds of issues is more connected to the industry they belong to, rather than the issue of CSR 
itself. There are some similar factors between the different industries, however that can be 
attributed more to the change society has gone through in the last couple of decades, from 
CSR being something unsubstantial to an issue that in essence can make or break a company.  
 
There is a need for further research in this area for example how companies can get further 
down the supply chain or what society can do to ensure good working conditions throughout 
the supply chain. Getting more research on this would enable both companies and 
independent initiatives to make more informed decisions with a clearer understanding of the 
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